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Abstract
Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guar-
antees and intergovernmental transfer schemes. This paper explores whether such
features of cooperative federations lead to subnational soft budget constraints using
panel data from the German States covering the 1975-2005 period. The methodology
is based on the premise that subnational governments’ borrowing will exhibit vertical
and horizontal strategic interactions if they operate under soft budget constraints.
Therefore, a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to
infer whether a cooperative federation like Germany is susceptible to soft budget con-
straints. The results suggest that state borrowing in Germany exhibited horizontal
but not vertical interactions during the time-frame of the analysis. This indicates
(i) that German States faced soft budget constraints and (ii) that they were more
concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume.
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1 Introduction
The fiscal federalism literature distinguishes two types of federations. Countries where
subnational governments possess substantial tax autonomy, where revenues are not shared,
and little fiscal equalization takes place are called competitive federations. In cooperative
federations, on the other hand, subnational tax autonomy tends to be low, revenues are
usually shared, considerable fiscal equalization takes place, and im- or explicit bailout
guarantees are often given (Schaltegger and Feld, 2009).
These two types of federations lead to different incentives for policy makers. Con-
sequently, they will have different implications for macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes
(Weingast, 2009). One criticism leveled against cooperative systems of federalism in recent
years is that they are much more susceptible to subnational over-borrowing. This asser-
tion is primarily founded on case studies which show that cooperative federations such as
Argentina (Dillinger and Webb, 1999), Brazil (Samuels, 2003), and Germany (Seitz, 1999)
have experienced considerably more problems with subnational debt than competitive fed-
erations like Switzerland (Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2007) and the United States (Inman,
2003).
These case studies suggest that lower-level jurisdictions in cooperative federations have
an incentive to over-borrow because of soft budget constraints. In federal fiscal relations,
soft budget constraints can emerge if subnational governments expect that some of the costs
of their borrowing will eventually be paid for by the federal government. It has been argued
in the literature that federal governments in cooperative federations are more likely to bail
out an indebted jurisdiction than those in competitive federations (Blankart and Klaiber,
2006). Indeed, it is a reasonable conjecture that once schools and police departments
have to be closed due to subnational over-borrowing, calls for a federal intervention will
be more pronounced in cooperative than in competitive federations because of differing
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expectations regarding the responsibilities of the federation. In particular, the existence
of an extensive fiscal equalization scheme signals to all states that the federation has the
institutional means and the political will to bail out an indebted jurisdiction.1
One methodological approach put forward in the literature to test whether the soft bud-
get constraints problem and thus subnational over-borrowing is more prevalent in coopera-
tive federations than in competitive ones is to simply regress a measure for the indebtedness
of the public sector on a measure for the importance of contemporaneous intergovernmental
transfers. The underlying idea behind this approach is that the importance of intergovern-
mental transfers is a reasonable proxy for the competitiveness of a federation. In general,
studies using this approach, e. g. De Mello (2000), Rodden (2002), and Baskaran (2010),
find that cooperative federations do not systematically borrow more than competitive ones.
However, one problem with the methodological approach advanced in these studies is
that they do not test the soft budget constraints argument properly. According to the
theoretical literature on soft budget constraints, the reason for their emergence are expected
future transfers that are paid to alleviate the costs associated with a large debt burden,
not contemporaneous transfers. Therefore, contemporaneous transfers are at best only an
imperfect proxy for bailout expectations, and at worst an incorrect one.
Due to this methodological problem, a second strand of the empirical literature focuses
on individual countries and explores whether specific institutional features within a country
lead to soft budget constraints.2 In this paper, I follow this strand of the literature and
1By now, there are also several theoretical contributions suggesting that bailout guarantees
and the possibility of discretionary transfers lead to fiscal distortions. See for example Wildasin
(1997), Qian and Roland (1998), Goodspeed (2002), Doi and Ihori (2006), Akai and Sato (2008),
Crivelli and Staal (2008), and Breuille´ and Vigneault (2010).
2For example, Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2005) argue that for local communities in Sweden,
past bailouts provide information regarding the likelihood of future bailouts. Using an instrumental variable
approach, they find that bailout expectations have a strong causal effect on local debt. Rodden (2000)
studies state borrowing in Germany. He argues that the structure of fiscal equalization in Germany
induces bailout expectations in the states that are net-recipients during horizontal equalization, but not in
the states that are net-payers. He then shows that net-recipient states are slower in adjusting their fiscal
policies to adverse fiscal shocks than net-paying states. Based on this finding, he concludes that bailout
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explore whether specific features of the fiscal constitution prevailing in the Federal Republic
of Germany have led to subnational soft budget constraints during the 1975-2005 period.
The methodology used in this paper is based on the premise that subnational borrow-
ing in cooperative federations should be characterized by vertical and horizontal strategic
interactions if subnational governments face soft budget constraints. In other words, if
a state expects that it will receive a bailout once it faces a severe fiscal crisis, then its
contemporaneous borrowing should react systematically to the borrowing of the federal
government (vertical interactions) and/or to the borrowing of other member states of the
federation (horizontal interactions).
Why should bailout guarantees lead to vertical strategic interactions in subnational bor-
rowing? If the federal government cannot commit to a no-bailout policy, every subnational
government has an incentive to increase borrowing. The magnitude of this incentive, how-
ever, will depend on the expected amount of resources the federal government will have
at its disposal when a bailout becomes necessary. If there is reason to suspect that the
federal government will have fewer resources in the future because of its own borrowing,
subnational incentives to over-borrow will be, ceteris paribus, less pronounced, and vice
versa.
Horizontal strategic interactions may emerge for two reasons. First, higher transfers to
other subnational jurisdictions imply lower transfers for one’s own jurisdiction as long as
federal resources are finite. This means that if other jurisdictions over-borrow, the available
resources for a bailout for one’s own jurisdiction will be reduced. Second, the decision of
whether or not to grant a bailout to a given subnational jurisdiction will be made not only
based on its own debt burden but also based on that in other subnational jurisdictions.
Usually, a jurisdiction has to prove that it faces extraordinary fiscal difficulties before it
will receive a bailout. If all jurisdictions exhibit a high debt burden, it is difficult for any
expectations lead to less sound fiscal policies. However, one problematic feature of his study is that the
methodology relies on the assumption that only net-recipient states operate under soft budget constraints.
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individual jurisdiction to argue that it is extraordinarily needy. Hence, each subnational
government has to take the borrowing in other jurisdictions into account when optimally
determining its own borrowing policy.3
For these reasons, it can be expected that subnational borrowing in cooperative feder-
ations will be characterized by vertical and horizontal interactions if subnational govern-
ments operate under soft budget constraints. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this line of
reasoning applies to Germany, an archetypical cooperative federation. Decisions regarding
whether or not a state should receive a federal bailout have been made in Germany by
the federal constitutional court. Relying on a number of constitutional stipulations (in
particular, Art. 72 , Art. 106, and Art. 107) which demand that equal living conditions
have to be guaranteed throughout the federation, the court granted two states, Saarland
and Bremen, a bailout in 1992.4 In determining whether the debt levels in Bremen and
Saarland necessitate a federal bailout, the constitutional court compared the debt to GDP
ratio and the fiscal burden caused by the interest payments in these two states with that
in all other German states.
This ruling by the constitutional court hence made explicit what subnational policy
makers in Germany have in all likelihood already known implicitly: that the probability
of a state receiving a bailout depends not only on its own borrowing, but also on the
borrowing of all other states. The ruling also underscored that the likelihood of another
state receiving a bailout depends on any given state’s borrowing insofar as it affects the
average debt burden of the subnational tier. Moreover, it implicitly affirmed that the fiscal
situation of the federal government will affect decisions regarding subnational bailouts.
It is consequently a reasonable conjecture that the borrowing polices of the constituent
3Note that the theoretical models developed by Wildasin (1997), Goodspeed (2002),
Breuille´ and Vigneault (2010), and Akai and Sato (2008) also suggest that bailout expectations will
lead to vertical and horizontal strategic interactions in fiscal policy.
4Even though the constitutional court declined to provide a bailout to the state of Berlin in 2006, it
did so on the grounds that Berlin was not “indebted enough” to require a bailout. In fact, it reaffirmed in
this ruling that a subnational debt burden that is “too high” should lead to a bailout (Ha¨de, 2007).
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members of the German federation, i. e. the states and the federal government, are inter-
dependent and will exhibit strategic interactions if some or all states operate under soft
budget constraints.
In this paper, therefore, I empirically study whether the borrowing in a given German
State reacts to the borrowing of other member states of the federation and/or to the
borrowing of the federal government in order to establish whether subnational governments
in Germany operate under soft budget constraints. More specifically, I estimate linear
models where the dependent variable is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i in year t and
the main independent variables are (i) the weighted average5 deficit to GDP ratio of the
“other” states in the federation and (ii) the deficit to GDP ratio of the federal government.
Since OLS does not produce consistent estimates in models with such fiscal policy in-
teractions, I rely on the instrumental variable approach to identify the effect of the other
states’ weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and the federal government’s deficit to GDP
ratio on the deficit to GDP ratio of a given state i. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any
natural-experiment type mechanism that induces truly exogenous variation in the endoge-
nous variables. Therefore, I use a set of instruments for which I argue below that they are
likely to be robust to certain sources of endogeneity. However, since I cannot rule out all
possible sources of endogeneity ex-ante, I also present a set of robustness checks in order
to explore to what extent the results are driven by each of the instruments.
I use the other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and their weighted
average contemporaneous population growth as instruments for their weighted average
deficit to GDP ratio. As instruments for the deficit to GDP ratio of the federal government,
I use a dummy variable indicating federal election years and a dummy variable indicating
the ideology of the federal government.
5I consider four different weighting schemes. See section 3.2 for more details.
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The lagged and contemporaneous deficits of other states will be related if there is some
persistence in deficits. The reason to expect a strong relationship between the other states’
population growth and their deficits is that population size is the most important determi-
nant of the amount of equalization transfers a state receives during horizontal and vertical
equalization in Germany. An increase in population size will therefore lead to higher
revenues and consequently to smaller deficits in any given state. A relationship between
federal deficits and federal election years can emerge if the federal government adjusts
deficits in view of federal elections. Similarly, it is also a reasonable conjecture that there
are ideological differences in the borrowing policies of the federal government.6
In addition to being strongly related to the endogenous variables, the instruments should
also be uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regressions in order to produce
reliable estimates. One reason to suspect such a correlation in the current context is reverse
causality between the deficit of a state i and the population growth in other states. Such
reverse causality may emerge if inhabitants migrate in view of state deficits. However, the
execution of a decision to migrate, even if it is based on deficits, will take time. Therefore,
even though this instrument may not be strictly exogenous, it appears to be feasible to
treat it as pre-determined. Nonetheless, I present in section 4.3 a robustness check where
the baseline models are re-estimated after omitting the other states’ weighted average
6I estimate least squares dummy variable (LSDV) and Anderson-Hsiao models in the empirical section.
In the first stage regressions for the LSDV models, the other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to
GDP ratio generally displays, as expected, a significantly positive correlation with their contemporaneous
weighted average deficit to GDP ratio. The weighted average of the other states’ population growth is
generally significantly and negatively correlated with their weighted average deficit to GDP ratio, which
is expected as well. I also find in the first stage regressions for the LSDV models that right-wing federal
governments have borrowed significantly more than left-wing federal governments and that federal deficits
have been significantly lower in election years. In the Anderson-Hsiao models, I use both first differences
and further lags of the other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and weighted average
population growth to instrument the first differences of their contemporaneous weighted average deficit to
GDP ratio. These instruments are significantly related to the endogenous variable, but because both first
differences and lags of the instruments are simultaneously included, the signs of the coefficients cannot be
as easily interpreted as for the LSDV models. For the first difference of the federal deficit to GDP ratio,
I use first differences of the federal ideology and election dummies as instruments in the Anderson-Hsiao
models. For these instruments, the first stage regressions in the Anderson-Hsiao models are similar to
those in the LSDV models.
7
population growth from the instrument set to explore to what extent the baseline results
rely on the validity of this particular instrument.
This kind of reverse-causality is implausible for the lagged weighted average deficit to
GDP ratio of other states since there cannot be an effect of the deficit of state i in period t
on the deficits of other states in t-1. However, it is possible that this variable has a direct
effect on the deficit of a state i if states react with some lag to each others’ borrowing. Since
I cannot exclude this possibility ex-ante, I explore in section 4.3 to what extent the baseline
results change when this variable is explicitly included in the second stage regressions.
Reversed causality between state deficits and the federal election and ideology dummies
is implausible as well because the deficit of any particular state i is unlikely to have an
effect on the timing or on the outcome of federal elections. However, these variables may
have a direct effect on state i’s deficits if some states receive fiscal benefits from a politically
aligned federal government or if they adjust their fiscal policy in view of federal elections.
Consequently, in line with the procedure for the other states’ lagged weighted average
deficit to GDP ratio, I explore the robustness of the results to including these instruments
in the second stage regressions in section 4.3.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briefly discuss the
federal system and the evolution of subnational debt in Germany. In section 3, I derive the
empirical specification for testing whether strategic interactions in subnational borrowing
exist and describe the data. In section 4, I report the results. They suggest the presence of
positive horizontal strategic interactions. However, while this finding is consistent with the
existence of soft budget constraints, subnational borrowing in Germany might exhibit hor-
izontal strategic interactions for other reasons than soft budget constraints. In particular,
if voters use the borrowing in other states as yardstick to evaluate the performance of their
own state governments, every state government might have an incentive to react strategi-
cally to other states’ borrowing, a mechanism that is referred to as yardstick competition
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(Salmon, 1987). Thus, section 5 explores whether the horizontal strategic interactions can
be explained by yardstick competition or whether soft budget constraints are indeed the
most likely explanation. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
2 Fiscal federalism in Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany is founded on strong federalist principles. It consists
of three tiers of government: federal (Bund), state (La¨nder), and local (Gemeinden). The
localities, however, are with respect to fiscal matters subordinate to the states. The im-
portant protagonists for the purposes of this paper are therefore the federal and state
governments.
Until the unification of West-Germany with the former GDR in October 1990, the Ger-
man federation consisted of eleven states.7 Unification took the form of an admittance of
five recreated states on the territory of the former GDR into the federation. Simultane-
ously, West- and East-Berlin were merged into a single city-state. The number of states
hence increased to sixteen. Three of these are city-states, comprising only one city: Berlin,
Bremen, and Hamburg.
The federal tier has more legislative power in Germany than in the US or Canada
(Watts and Hobson, 2000). However, the states have significant influence on federal leg-
islation. All federal laws that have financial consequences for the states need majority
support in the Bundesrat, i. e. the second chamber of parliament where state governments
are organized. For all other legislation, the Bundesrat has a suspensive veto.8
7The city-state of West-Berlin had a special position since the western allies were formally responsible
for its administration. However, it was de facto the eleventh state of West-Germany.
8The Bundesrat consists of representatives of the state governments, usually the first minister and
other senior state ministers. The number of votes allocated to each state depends positively on the size
of the population. Votes are, however, not proportional to population size. Less populous states have
a disproportionately large share of votes. The number of votes can vary over time, depending on the
development of the population.
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Subnational expenditures are largely financed through tax revenues, transfers, and debt.
In general, state governments are free to borrow. There is a nominal rule-based borrowing
restriction for the federal and state tier, but it has been widely criticized as ineffective.9
That it has indeed not prevented the persistent growth of subnational debt, can be inferred
from figure 1 where the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier is plotted over time.
This figure reveals that the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier has increased from
just over 10% to around 25% between 1975 and 2005.
Figures 2 and 3 show that, first, all states have displayed on average positive deficits over
the 1975-2005 period. Thus, all states have contributed to the accumulation of subnational
debt in Germany. Second, these figures also reveal that the aggregated deficits of the
subnational sector have been positive in every year, even though there is some over-time
variation. While deficits have on average declined until the nineties, they sharply rose after
1990, then steadily declined until 2000, only to increase again thereafter.
While state governments possess significant expenditure and borrowing autonomy, they
have almost no tax autonomy.10 There are four types of taxes in Germany: federal, state,
local, and shared taxes. Taxes designated as federal, state, or local accrue exclusively
to the respective tier of government. The most important shared taxes are the income,
value added, and the corporate tax. The revenue from these taxes constitutes around
three-quarters of total tax revenue. Their rates and bases are determined at the federal
level in negotiations between the federal and subnational governments and are harmonized
between all states, i. e. rates and bases are the same throughout the federation.
9The current borrowing restriction is the so called “golden rule” which stipulates that deficits may
not be larger than investments. However, it is fairly easy to bypass this rule. For example, it is difficult
to distinguish capital and current expenditures. Moreover, the rule can be legally broken if the finance
minister declares that there is a serious disruption of the macroeconomic equilibrium. It is therefore
not surprising that this rule has not prevented the continuous growth of subnational debt in the last
few decades. However, Germany is currently involved in a major reform of its fiscal constitution. One
important aspect of this reform is the introduction of a new borrowing restriction in 2011 that is supposedly
stricter than the current golden rule.
10See Watts and Hobson (2000) and Federal Ministry of Finance (2009) for detailed surveys of Ger-
many’s system of fiscal federalism.
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The shared taxes are first distributed according to a pre-specified formula between the
federal and subnational tiers.11 The share of the income tax revenues accruing to the states
is allocated among the individual states according to the residence principle (revenues
accrue to the state in which the taxed person lives). The states’ share of the corporate tax
revenues is allocated according to the principle of permanent establishment (tax revenues
from taxing a company’s commercial unit accrue to the state in which that commercial unit
is located). 75% of the states’ share of the revenues from the value added tax are allocated
on a per-capita basis. The remaining 25% are used to increase the fiscal capacities of those
states that have below average per-capita revenues after the allocation of the revenues
from the state and shared taxes. Hence, the sharing rule for the value added tax already
equalizes revenues between states and is therefore referred to as the first leg of the federal
equalization system.
After the fiscal flows during the primary allocation of shared taxes, intergovernmental
transfers are paid to explicitly equalize fiscal capacities among the states. First, revenues
flow from fiscally strong to fiscally weak states. This stage is referred to as horizontal equal-
ization (La¨nderfinanzausgleich) because the federal government is not involved. The exact
definition of what constitutes a fiscally strong or a fiscally weak state is complicated, but,
in general, states that have above-average per-capita revenues after the primary allocation
of tax revenues are considered to be fiscally strong and vice versa.
The second stage of equalization consists of various vertical transfers from the federal
government to the states. First, all fiscally weak states receive general-purpose transfers
in order to increase their fiscal capacities further. In addition, vertical transfers are also
paid to certain fiscally weak states to reimburse them for specific expenditure needs.
11Because the localities are considered to be part of the states for fiscal purposes, I only focus on the
federal and state governments in the following even though the localities receive a small fraction of the
revenues from the shared taxes.
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Finally, there are explicit bailout transfers (Sanierungs-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen)
that can be paid by the federal government to highly indebted states in order to help them
reduce their debt burden. In practice, the federal constitutional court has to determine
that a state is in a budgetary crisis before these transfers are paid. Hitherto, two states,
Saarland and Bremen, have received these bailout transfers from 1994 until 2004, following
a ruling by the constitutional court in 1992.
3 Empirical Analysis
As argued in the introduction, a test for strategic interactions in borrowing can be used
to infer whether a cooperative federation is characterized by soft budget constraints. In
general, studies exploring fiscal interactions tend to focus on taxes (Devereux et al., 2008;
Edmark and Agren, 2008) and expenditures (Case et al., 1993; Baicker, 2005); studies ex-
ploring fiscal interactions in borrowing policies are rarer. One exception is Landon and Smith
(2000) who study for Canada how debt accumulation by the central and provincial gov-
ernments affects the creditworthiness of other federation members.
3.1 Empirical model
The following model is estimated to explore the existence of vertical and horizontal strategic
interactions in subnational borrowing:
Deficiti,t = αWt ×Deficiti,t + βDeficit
fed
t + ζDeficiti,t−1 + δxi,t + γi + ρTrend + ǫi,t. (1)
In this model, Deficiti,t is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i in year t, Wt × Deficiti,t =
∑
j 6=iwj,tDeficitj,t is the weighted average of the other states’ deficit to GDP ratio in year
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t, Deficitfedt is the federal deficit to GDP ratio, Deficiti,t−1 is the lagged deficit to GDP
ratio of state i, xi,t is a vector of control variables as described further below and listed in
table 1, γi are cross-section fixed effects, and Trend is a time-trend.
The existence of horizontal and vertical interactions is tested with the coefficient esti-
mates for α and β. If the estimate for α is significantly different from 0, it can be concluded
that horizontal strategic interactions in state borrowing exist. Similarly, finding that the
estimate for β is significantly different from 0 indicates the presence of vertical strategic
interactions.
What are the expected signs of the estimates for α and β? If soft budget constraints
exist, the direction of the vertical interactions should be negative. The reason is that if the
federal government borrows more in a given year, the amount of federal resources that will
be available in the future for a bailout of a state will be lower. Everything else equal, this
reduction in expected resources that are available for a bailout should incentivize a state i
to reduce its own borrowing.
The direction of the horizontal interactions is more difficult to predict. On the one hand,
an increase in the borrowing of other states should incentivize any given state i to increase
its own borrowing because by doing so it can retain or increase its chances for a bailout
and/or reduce the likelihood that other states will get one. On the other hand, a rise in
the debt level of other states means that these states increase, ceteris paribus, their claim
on limited bailout resources. Hence, the expected amount of bailout resources available to
state i will be lower, thereby incentivizing it to reduce its own borrowing. Because of these
two countervailing effects, the sign of the estimate for α is difficult to predict ex-ante.
Estimating model 1 involves solving two problems (Brueckner, 2003). First, the weight
wj,t that state j has in the reaction function of state i in year t has to be determined. As
these weights cannot be estimated, they have to be imposed ex-ante. The usual procedure
is therefore to experiment with different weighting schemes (see the next section).
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The second problem is that estimating model 1 with OLS or an analogous estimator
produces inconsistent estimates because the deficits in different states and at the federal
level are, by definition, determined simultaneously if fiscal interactions exist. As indicated
in the introduction, I rely on the instrumental variables approach to solve this problem. I
use the weighted average of the other states’ lagged deficit to GDP ratio and the weighted
average of the other states’ population growth as instruments for the weighted average of
the other states’ contemporaneous deficit to GDP ratio, Wt × Deficiti,t. For the federal
deficit to GDP ratio, Deficitfedt , I use a federal election year dummy and a dummy indicating
the ideology of the federal government. The federal election year dummy assumes the value
1 in years with a federal election, and else 0. The federal ideology dummy assumes the
value 1 in years with a conservative federal government (a federal government that is led
by the CDU-party), and else 0.
3.2 Weights
The weights of the other states in model 1 have to be chosen ex-ante. By convention, these
weights have the property that, first, state i itself receives a weight of 0 and, second, that
the weights of all other states wj,t sum to 1 (i. e. they are row-normalized).
I use four different weighting schemes. First, I give all other states the same weight.
This weighting scheme will be referred to as AVG. The weights are recalculated every year,
hence the weight of state j in i’s reaction function is given by:
wAVGj,t =
1∑
k 6=i Ik,t
, (2)
where Ik,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when state k exists in year t and
else 0. This implies that the weights of the eleven West-German States remain constant
at 1/10 until 1991, the year after unification, and then fall to 1/15 as five new states were
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created after unification. The newly formed East-German States also receive a weight of
1/15 from 1991 onward in this weighting scheme.
Second, I assign weights to each of the other states according to their population sizes.
States with a larger population receive a relatively larger weight:
wPOPj,t =
POPj,t∑
k 6=i POPk,t
. (3)
This weighting scheme is referred to as POP. The idea behind this weighting scheme is
that the borrowing policy of a big state will impact the borrowing policy of a state i more
than that of a small state. Because the weights are recalculated every year, they reflect
any changes in population sizes from year to year. The population in East-Germany is
incorporated in this weighting scheme from 1991 onwards.
Third, I assign weights to the other states according to their position during horizontal
equalization. If state i is a net-recipient state in year t, all other net-recipient states in
year t are considered to affect state i’s borrowing and receive the same positive weight,
whereas the net-paying states will be considered as irrelevant for its borrowing and receive
a weight of 0. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying states
in this year receive a positive weight, whereas all net-recipient states receive a weight of 0.
More formally:
wLFA Ij,t =


1∑
k 6=i Ik,t
if i and j have the same position during horizontal equalization
0 else.
(4)
Here, Ik is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have the same position during
horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA I (the
acronym LFA stands for “La¨nderfinanzausgleich”). It is based on the premise that states
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are particularly concerned with the borrowing policy of fiscally similar states. For example,
a net-recipient state might feel compelled to increase its deficits if another net-recipient
state incurs a large deficit in order to retain its chances for a federal bailout, but it may
be indifferent to the fiscal policy of a net-paying state because it does not perceive it as a
competitor in the bailout game.
Fourth, I again assign weights to the other states according to their position during
horizontal equalization, but in the opposite fashion to the LFA I weights. If state i is a
net-recipient state in year t, the borrowing of all other net-recipient states in year t is
considered to be unrelated to state i’s borrowing in this weighting scheme. These states
therefore receive a weight of 0. The borrowing policy in all net-paying states, on the other
hand, is assumed to affect the borrowing of state i. These states consequently receive the
same positive weight. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying
states in this year receive a weight of 0, whereas all net-recipient states receive the same
positive weight. More formally:
wLFA IIj,t =


1∑
k 6=i Ik,t
if i and j have different positions during horizontal equalization
0 else.
(5)
Here, Ik is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have different positions during
horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA II. It is
based on the premise that net-paying states are particularly concerned with the borrowing
policy of net-recipient states and vice versa. For example, by incurring higher deficits
themselves (or by saving less), net-paying states can lower the likelihood that net-recipient
states receive bailouts.
16
Because the LFA I and LFA II weights are recalculated every year, they reflect any
changes in the position of a state during horizontal equalization from one year to another.
This is particularly relevant for Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. Bavaria was always
a net-recipient until 1986, then held either a neutral position or was a net-payer until 1992.
In 1992, it was for the last time in the sample period a net-recipient, thereafter it was
always a net-payer. North Rhine-Westphalia has usually assumed a net-paying or neutral
position, but received some minor amounts from horizontal equalization in the eighties
and early nineties. I therefore choose the LFA I and LFA II weights accordingly. This
means for the LFA I weights that in years where Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia
were net-recipients, I assign to them a positive weight if state i is a net-recipient and else
0. In years where they were net-payers, I assign to them a positive weight when state i is
a net-payer and else 0. I apply the opposite procedure for the LFA II weights.
In years where a state assumed a neutral position (i. e. neither payed nor received
anything during horizontal equalization), I drop it from the sample in the regressions with
the LFA weights. This effectively means that such a state receives a weight of 0 in the
reaction function of the other states, i. e. its deficits are assumed to be unrelated to the
deficits of other states in these years. For this reason, the number of observations in the
regressions with the LFA weights is slightly smaller than in those with the AVG and POP
weights.12
3.3 Data
The dependent variable in all regressions is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i. It is
constructed by dividing the absolute nominal change (i. e. the first difference) in the
12Only few states have held a neutral position during the 1975-2005 period: Bavaria in 1987 and 1988,
Hamburg in 1988 and 1992; North Rhine-Westphalia in 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986; and
Schleswig-Holstein in 1998. Finally, Berlin and the East-German States were not part of the horizontal
equalization scheme before 1995, instead they received either grants from the federal government or from
special funds. These observations, too, are dropped in the LFA regressions.
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capital market debt (i. e. the long-term obligations) of a state and its localities with the
nominal state GDP.
The control variables of interest are: i) the weighted average of the other states’ deficit
to GDP ratio and ii) the federal deficit to GDP ratio. As with the states’ deficit to GDP
ratio, the one for the federal government is constructed by dividing the absolute change
in the capital market debt of the federal government by the nominal GDP of the whole
federation.
The debt to GDP ratio of a state i at the beginning of period t is included as a control
variable to capture the effect of the debt burden on a state’s borrowing policy.
The revenue to GDP ratio is included to control for the resources a state has available.
Controlling for this ratio is important in the current context because otherwise it would be
difficult to distinguish between fiscal interactions due to deliberate choices by state govern-
ments and a mere correlation of fiscal balances because of the nature of fiscal equalization
in Germany. For example, the equalization system ensures that a negative revenue shock
in one single state leads to a reduction in revenues in all other states as well, which might
then result in a non-deliberate increase in borrowing in all states. However, by including
a state’s revenue to GDP ratio in the model, it is possible to control for this alternative
explanation for a uniform evolution of subnational fiscal balances.13
Population growth is included to capture congestion and/or scale effects on the budget.
The unemployment rate is included to control for business cycle effects. The share of the
“young” (≤ 15 years) and the “old” (≥ 65 years) in the total population is included to
capture the effect of the demographic structure of a state. Productivity growth is included
to capture how the productivity of the economy affects deficits.
13Note that revenues are largely predetermined from the perspective of a state because the fiscal con-
stitution in Germany gives the states only minuscule tax autonomy and the tax sharing rules are fixed by
federal law well before the determination of the deficit. Reverse causality is therefore unlikely. Nonetheless,
the models reported below were re-estimated after including the states’ revenue to GDP ratio in the set
of endogenous variables and instrumenting it with its first lag. The results (available from the author)
regarding the existence of horizontal and vertical interactions were essentially the same.
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A dummy variable that is 1 after 1991 and 0 before is included to capture the effect of
unification. A dummy indicating whether year t is an election year in state i is included
to control for political business cycles.
State i’s number of votes in the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, is included
because states tend to trade their acceptance of certain legislation introduced by the federal
government for larger federal transfers. Thus, these votes constitute an asset that can
translate into higher revenues in the future. An increase in the number of votes might
therefore induce a state to incur higher deficits.
A number of dummy variables indicating the ideology of the government are included.
During the time-frame of the analysis, German States have witnessed six different types of
(coalition) governments. They are described in more detail in table 1. One of the ideology
dummies has to be dropped in the regressions because of perfect collinearity. I drop the
dummy indicating a sole CDU government. All estimates for the ideology variables should
therefore be interpreted relative to the CDU dummy. Around 27% of the observations are
characterized by sole CDU governments.
The interest rate on long-term government bonds is included to capture the costs of
borrowing. This variable varies over time but not over the states. It is a reasonably good
approximation of the states’ borrowing costs given that their bonds tend to be rated as well
as federal bonds. If a rating agency attaches different ratings to state bonds, the variance
of these ratings is very small and only due to the speed with which the agency expects a
federal bailout to be administered if a state should come to face unresolvable budgetary
problems (Seitz, 1999; Rodden, 2005).
The federal debt to GDP ratio at the beginning of period t is included to capture the
effect of the absolute fiscal position of the federal government: if the federal government
has a large debt burden, subnational governments might think it prudent to incur lower
deficits.
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I also include in all regressions cross-section fixed effects and a time-trend. The fixed
effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states. The time trend is
included instead of time dummies because the effect of time dummies cannot be separately
identified from that of the weighted average deficit to GDP ratio of the other states’ when
uniform weights are used (Devereux et al., 2008). Moreover, federal level variables cannot
be included as well when time dummies are present because of perfect multicollinearity.
That is, it would be impossible to study vertical strategic interactions.
4 Estimation and results
It is well known that estimating a model that includes a lagged dependent variable and fixed
effects with the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator leads to the Nickell-Bias
because the within-transformed lagged dependent variable is correlated with the trans-
formed error term (Nickell, 1981).14 However, the bias approaches 0 when the time-
dimension becomes large, i. e. the LSDV estimator is consistent for large T. The ques-
tion is then whether the time-dimension of the data at hand, which ranges from 1975 to
2005, can be considered as large enough to apply the LSDV estimator. Using simulations,
Judson and Owen (1999) report that with a time-dimension of 30 or higher, the LSDV
estimator performs well compared to the alternatives. Given that my dataset is at this
margin, I estimate model 1 first with the LSDV estimator, but also use thereafter in section
4.2 the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
14There are several estimators available to estimate a fixed effects model. One common alternative is
the LSDV estimator. When there are no endogenous variables, the LSDV estimator functions as follows.
First, the fixed effects are explicitly included in the regression. Then the model is estimated with OLS.
Other popular alternatives are the within- and first-difference estimators. (It can be shown that the LSDV
and within-estimator are equivalent, but a degrees of freedom correction has to be applied to the standard
errors when the within-estimator is used). However, all three estimators lead to biased estimates when
a lagged dependent variable is included in the model. To deal with this problem, a number of dynamic
panel data estimators, including the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, have been developed.
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Several diagnostic tests are reported in the regression tables. Instrument validity is
tested with the Hansen-J overidentification test. Instrument strength is tested with the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, which is the appropriate test statistic for weak identi-
fication in the case of multiple endogenous variables and non- i. i. d. errors (most regressions
reported below exhibit heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). In addition, I also report
underidentification tests based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic.
Finally, the presence of autocorrelation is tested with a procedure suggested by Devereux et al.
(2008). After estimating a model, the residuals are predicted. Then, the model is re-
estimated after including the first lag of the residuals as an additional control variable. If
this variable turns out to be significant, it is concluded that there is evidence for auto-
correlation. In the regression tables further below, the row entitled autocorrelation test
reports the p-value of the lagged residuals in the appended regressions.
4.1 LSDV estimations
The results of estimating model 1 with the LSDV estimator while using the two stage least
squares (2SLS) approach to instrument the endogenous variables are reported in table 2.
Four different regression results are reported. They are entitled according to the weighting
scheme that is used, i. e. AVG, POP, LFA I, and LFA II.
The autocorrelation tests reported at the bottom of the table 2 provide evidence for
autocorrelation in at least three regressions. In addition, there is also evidence for het-
eroscedasticity (test results not reported). All hypothesis tests are therefore based on
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.15
The weak identification test statistic is over 10 in all regressions. The Hansen-J test
performs well in the LFA I and LFA II regressions, in contrast to its performance in the
15Inspection of the full results (available from the author) for the appended regressions shows that
negative and not positive autocorrelation is found in these models. Not adjusting the standard errors for
autocorrelation leads to essentially the same results.
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AVG and POP regressions. Overall, the Hansen-J tests suggests that the LFA I and LFA
II results are more reliable than the AVG and POP results for this set of regressions.
The estimate for α, the effect of the other states’ weighted average deficit to GDP ratio
on state i’s deficit to GDP ratio, is positive in all but the AVG regression. It is also
significant at least at the ten percent level in the LFA I and LFA II regressions. Since the
results from the LFA I and LFA II regressions are more reliable than those from the AVG
and POP regressions according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude based on this set of results
that there is evidence for horizontal strategic interactions in subnational borrowing.
The estimates for β, the effect of the federal deficit to GDP ratio, is significantly negative
for the POP regression, but insignificant for all other weighting schemes. Since the POP
regression is unreliable according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude that there is no consistent
evidence for the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
Overall, these results suggest that the borrowing behavior of German States exhibited
horizontal strategic interactions during the sample period. The numerical value of the
estimated coefficients in the LFA I and LFA II regressions is around 0.47. These estimates
are large, but not implausible. In particular, they do not suggest explosive behavior.
Taking α = 0.47, it can be shown for uniform weights that an exogenous increase in the
deficit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in state i leads, after all feedback effects, to a
final increase of 1.027 percentage points in state i’s deficit to GDP ratio and to an increase
of 0.057 percentage points in each of the other 15 states. Thus, the aggregated subnational
deficit to GDP ratio rises by 1.882 percentage points due to an exogenous increase in the
deficit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in a state i.
4.2 Anderson-Hsiao estimations
As stated further above, one problem when estimating a dynamic model with fixed effects
is that the LSDV estimator is inconsistent for small T. Therefore, alternative estimation
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methods have been developed to estimate such models consistently if T is small. According
to the simulations in Judson and Owen (1999), the best alternative in the current context
is the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
This estimator can be illustrated in a nutshell as follows (Roodman, 2008). Consider
the following dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable:
yi = αyi,t−1 + δxi + νi + ǫit, (6)
where yi,t−1 is the lagged dependent variable, the xi is a vector of the remaining control
variables that can be endogenous or exogenous, and the νi are cross-section fixed effects.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimator starts out by applying the first difference transformation
to model 6:
∆yi,t = α∆yi,t−1 + δ∆xi +∆ǫit. (7)
If model 6 were a simple static fixed effects specification, model 7 could be consistently
estimated with OLS (or with 2SLS if some of the variables in the x-vector are endogenous).
However, since the first-difference of the lagged dependent variable ∆yi,t−1 and the first-
difference of the idiosyncratic error ∆ǫit are correlated, OLS would be inconsistent. Thus,
the first difference of the lagged dependent variable has to be instrumented. The variant of
the Anderson-Hsiao estimator that I use in the following instruments the first difference of
the lagged dependent variable ∆yi,t−1 with the second lag of the dependent variable yi,t−2.
The results from estimating model 1 with this Anderson-Hsiao estimator are reported in
table 3. In all regressions, I continue to use 2SLS. I instrument the first difference of the
other states’ weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and the first difference of the federal
government’s deficit to GDP ratio with the first differences and lags of the instruments
already used in the LSDV regressions: (i) the first difference and the first lag of the other
states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio (i. e. the second lag of the other states’
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weighted average deficit to GDP ratio), (ii) the first difference and the first lag of the other
states’ weighted average population growth, and (iii) the first differences of the federal
election and ideology dummies.
The significance tests are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust stan-
dard errors. I use autocorrelation robust standard errors since there is evidence for first-
order autocorrelation. As indicated by the second-order autocorrelation test at the bottom
of table 3, there is no evidence for second-order autocorrelation, hence the second lag of
the dependent variable is a valid instrument for the first difference.
The Hansen-J tests are insignificant for all except the LFA I regression. The weak
identification test statistics are larger than 10 in all but the LFA II regression. Thus, while
not perfect, the diagnostic tests do not suggest that the regressions suffer from common
problems and, consequently, that they are reliable, at least to the extent to which they
suggest similar conclusions.
Indeed, the results with respect to the variables of interest are reasonably similar in all
regressions and confirm the conclusions from the previous section. The estimate for α is
consistently positive. It is also significant in the AVG, POP, and LFA I regressions. The
estimate for β, on the other hand, is insignificant except in the POP regression. Thus, there
is strong evidence for the presence of horizontal strategic interactions, but little evidence
for the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
4.3 Robustness checks
The goal of this section is to explore the robustness of the results in the last sections to
the possible invalidity of the instruments through further empirical tests. As argued in the
introduction, each of the instruments might suffer from a specific source of endogeneity.
There might be reverse causality between the deficit of a state i and other states’ population
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growth. In contrast, other states’ lagged deficit, federal elections, and the ideology of the
federal government might have a direct effect on state i’s deficit.
In order to address the possible reverse causality between state i’s deficit and other states’
population growth, I report replications of the LSDV and Anderson-Hsiao estimations in
the last sections after dropping the other states’ weighted average population growth from
the instrument set. To address the concern of a direct effect of either the lagged deficit
of the other states, or federal elections, or the ideology of the federal government on state
i’s deficit, I report replications where each of these variables is explicitly included in the
second stage regressions. The replications of the LSDV models are reported in table 4
while those of the Anderson-Hsiao models are reported in table 5.
According to these tables, omitting the other states’ weighted average population growth
reduces the significance of the estimate for α, especially in the LSDV estimations. While
none of the coefficients are significant in the LSDV estimations, they continue to be signif-
icantly positive for the POP and LFA II weighting scheme in the Anderson-Hsiao estima-
tions. It appears that with respect to the estimate for α, the Anderson-Hsiao estimations
are more robust to the exclusion of this instrument than the LSDV estimations. The es-
timate for β is generally insignificant (there is one exception) and thus in line with the
baseline regressions.
Including the other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio in the second
stage regression causes the estimate for α to become significantly positive in the AVG
and POP regressions and insignificant in the LFA II regression when the LSDV estimator
is used. However, the numerical values of the estimates for α in the AVG and POP
regressions are very large, which suggests that these models are not reliable. But the fact
that the LFA I and LFA II regressions continue to display reasonable numerical values
and remain positive is reassuring, even if the coefficient turns insignificant in the LFA II
regression. With respect to the Anderson-Hsiao models, including the first difference and
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the second lag of the weighted average deficit to GDP ratio of the other states in the second
stage regressions reduces the significance of the estimates for α. However, the estimates
remain consistently positive. The estimates for β are in general insignificant (there are two
exceptions) in the LSDV and Anderson-Hsiao estimations.
Including the federal election dummy in the second stage regression does not change the
results with respect to α or β in a meaningful way, neither in the LSDV nor in the Anderson-
Hsiao models. Including the federal government’s ideology in the second stage regressions
does not change the results with respect to α significantly either. In the Anderson-Hsiao
estimations, however, it leads to significantly negative estimates for β in the POP and the
LFA I regressions. In the LSDV estimations, the estimate for β displays a significantly
negative coefficient in the AVG and POP regressions. There is thus some, albeit weak,
evidence for the presence of vertical strategic interactions when the federal ideology dummy
is included in the second stage regression.
Overall, the main conclusion from the baseline regressions, i. e. that there were positive
horizontal interactions in the borrowing policy of German States during the sample period,
remains reasonably robust in the Anderson-Hsiao regressions. The LSDV regressions are
less robust. In particular, omitting the other states’ weighted average population growth
as instrument causes the estimates for α in the LFA I and LFA II regressions to become
insignificant.
5 Soft budget constraints vs. yardstick competition
The estimates reported in the previous section indicate that the borrowing policy of Ger-
man States displayed horizontal strategic interactions during the 1975-2005 period. Until
now, it has been implicitly assumed that soft budget constraints are the cause for these
interactions. This is indeed a likely explanation given the provisions in the German fiscal
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constitution. However, there is also an alternative explanation for the horizontal strate-
gic interactions: that state governments engaged in yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987;
Besley and Case, 1995). Both explanations result in the same reduced form for the econo-
metric model (Brueckner, 2003). Therefore, it is not possible to conclusively determine on
the basis of the estimates reported in the previous sections which of the two mechanisms
is responsible for the horizontal strategic interactions.
In this section, therefore, I investigate this issue further. Since expectations cannot be
measured, it is difficult to directly test to what extent bailout expectations and hence
soft budget constraints drive strategic interactions. However, the yardstick competition
explanation for strategic interactions can be tested based on the following argument: If
strategic interactions are primarily driven by yardstick competition, the estimates for α
should be i) significantly larger in election than in non-election years and ii) when the
government is formed by conservative instead of left-wing parties. The reason to expect a
larger effect in election years is that if a state government believes that its electorate uses
the borrowing in other states as a yardstick for evaluating its own borrowing, the borrowing
in other states will be particularly important when an election is imminent. The reason
to expect a larger effect for conservative parties is that their constituency tends to be
more critical of public borrowing. Hence, a conservative government can win favor with its
voters by running a sounder fiscal policy than the other states in the federation. Likewise,
it will disenchant its voters more than a left-wing government if it incurs higher deficits
than other states.
To explore the election-based explanation for yardstick competition, I construct two new
variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states’ deficit
to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 in election years and 0 else; the other is
constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states deficit to GDP ratio
with a dummy that is 1 in non-election years and 0 else. These new variables thus separately
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incorporate the other states’ deficits in election and non-election years. I also create a new
set of instruments according to this procedure based on the old set. I then re-estimate
model 1 with these variables such that a separate effect in election and non-election years
is estimated.
To explore the validity of the ideology-based explanation for yardstick competition, I
again construct two new variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average
of the other states’ deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 when the govern-
ment is formed by the CDU alone or a CDU-FDP coalition (these two types of governments
are usually considered to be conservative in Germany), and 0 else; the other is constructed
by interacting the weighted average of the other states’ deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy
that is 1 when the government is formed by a left or centrist coalition, and 0 else. As
for the election-based explanation, I also create a new set of instruments according to the
same procedure, and then use these variables to re-estimate model 1.
For brevity, I only report the coefficient estimates for the weighted averages of the other
states in table 6 (the full results are available from the author). Whether or not the
estimates are larger for election years or, respectively, under a conservative government
than in non-election years or, respectively, under a non-conservative government, can be
tested with a t-test. Hence, I also report the p-value of a t-test on the equality of each of
the two coefficients in these tables.
The t-tests show that the estimated coefficients for election and non-election years and
those for conservative and non-conservative governments are not significantly different.
This indicates that yardstick competition is not the reason for the horizontal strategic
interactions, thereby suggesting that soft budget constraints are the underlying cause for
the horizontal interactions in subnational borrowing.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore whether the German States face soft budget con-
straints by testing for strategic interactions in state borrowing with panel data covering the
1975-2005 period. In the empirical analysis, I found evidence pointing toward the existence
of horizontal strategic interactions, but no evidence for vertical strategic interactions. With
regard to the horizontal interactions, tests indicated that they were not due to yardstick
competition. Soft budget constraints were hence identified as the most likely explanation
for the horizontal interactions.
The fact that subnational borrowing in Germany was characterized by horizontal strate-
gic interactions indicates that state governments believed that there was the distinct pos-
sibility of a bailout during the 1975-2005 period. The finding that there were no vertical
strategic interactions indicates that subnational governments have disregarded the bor-
rowing of the federal government during the time-frame of the analysis. In conjunction
with the fact that the direction of the horizontal interactions is positive, this suggests that
subnational governments were mostly concerned with the likelihood of receiving a bailout
and less concerned about its amount– apparently, state governments did not believe that
the federal fiscal commons would be exhausted in a significant way by federal borrowing
or by bailout transfers paid to other states.
This paper hence supports the notion that the fiscal constitution that prevailed in Ger-
many during the 1975-2005 period led to a systematic upward-ratcheting of subnational
debt. The necessity of a reform of the federal fiscal constitution and its cooperative el-
ements, in particular the intergovernmental transfer scheme, has indeed been recognized
by policy makers, and this issue was part of the negotiations that were begun in 2005
on the wider “Fo¨deralismusreform” (the reform of federalism in Germany). However, no
agreement could be reached in these negotiations with respect to the intergovernmental
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transfer scheme and it was decided to continue with the current system at least until 2019.
Instead of a reform of the transfer scheme, a new borrowing rule was introduced for both
the federal and state governments in the hope that it will be more effective in limiting the
growth of debt at all tiers of government than the existing one. It will be interesting to
observe how this so called “debt brake” will affect subnational soft budget constraints in
the coming years.
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Figure 1: Debt to GDP ratio of the state tier in Germany, 1975-2005
Figure 2: Mean deficit to GDP ratio in German States 1975-2005. The State
codes are defined as follows: BAY (Bavaria), BB (Brandenburg), BER (Berlin), BW (Baden-
Wuerttemberg) HB (Bremen), HE (Hesse), HH (Hamburg), MV (Mecklenburg-Western Pomera-
nia), NDS (Lower-Saxony), NRW (North Rhine-Westphalia), RP (Rhineland-Palatinate), SAAR
(Saarland) SH (Schleswig-Holstein ), SN (Saxony), ST (Saxony-Anhalt), TH (Thuringia)
Figure 3: Deficit to GDP ratio in German States 1975-2005
Table 1: Definition and source of variables
Label Description Source
Deficit to GDP ratio State deficit/GDP ratio German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Deficit to GDP ratio of other
states
Weighted average of other states’ deficit/GDP ra-
tios
German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Federal deficit to GDP ratio Deficit/GDP ratio of the federal government German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Debt to GDP ratio State debt/GDP ratio at beginning of period t German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Revenue to GDP ratio State revenue/GDP ratio German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Population growth State population growth German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Unemployment State unemployment rate German Federal Agency of
Employment
Population share of young Share of “young” (≤15 years) in state population German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Population share of old Share of “old” (≥65 years) in state population German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Productivity growth State productivity growth (growth of real GDP per
Worker)
Federal and State Statistical
Offices (Arbeitskreis VGR der
La¨nder)
Votes in Bundesrat State votes in second chamber of parliament Pitlik et al. (2005) and own
calculations
Unification Dummy=1 if year ≥ 1991 Own calculations
Election year Dummy = 1 if state election year Own calculations based on
www.bundeswahlleiter.de
SPD Dummy = 1 if state government formed by SPD
only
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-Green Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
Green party coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU-SPD Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by
CDU-SPD coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by
CDU-FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-Green-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
Green party-FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-PDS Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
PDS coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by CDU
only
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
Interest rate Interest on long-term government bonds OECD
Federal debt Federal debt/GDP ratio at beginning of period t German Federal Statistical Of-
fice
Table 2: Horizontal and vertical interactions in subna-
tional borrowing, German states, 1975-2005, Least
squares dummy variable estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deficit to GDP ratio of other states -0.034 0.286 0.467** 0.483*
(-0.096) (0.827) (2.185) (1.734)
Federal deficit to GDP ratio -0.108 -0.128* 0.041 0.095
(-1.102) (-1.685) (0.387) (0.971)
N 369 369 345 345
F 110.230 110.399 57.059 54.050
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.019 0.010 0.511 0.526
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.923 26.294 20.668 27.468
Autocorr.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.112 0.087
a The dependent variable is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i, the independent variables of
interest are the weighted average of the other states’ deficit to GDP ratio and the federal
government’s deficit to GDP ratio.
b The instruments are: other states’ weighted average population growth, lagged weighted average
of other states’ deficit to GDP ratio, federal election year dummy, federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i. e. AVG
refers to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where
states that are fiscally similar to state i receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting
scheme where fiscally dissimilar states receive a positive weight.
d Control variables whose results are omitted (full results can be found in table A.1 in the ap-
pendix): Deficit to GDP ratiot−1, Debt to GDP ratio, Revenue to GDP ratio, Population
growth, Unemployment rate, Population share of young, Population share of old, Productiv-
ity growth, Votes in Bundesrat, Unification, Election year, SPD-Green-FDP dummy, SPD
dummy, SPD-PDS dummy, SPD-Green dummy, SPD-FDP dummy, CDU-SPD dummy, CDU-
FDP dummy, Interest rate, Federal debt, Trend.
e Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
f t-statistics in parentheses.
g t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
h State fixed effects and time trend included in all models.
i The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification.
Table 3: Horizontal and vertical interactions in sub-
national borrowing, German states, 1975-2005,
Anderson-Hsiao estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deficit of other states 0.393* 0.379** 0.256* 0.295
(1.843) (2.283) (1.708) (1.322)
Federal deficit -0.001 -0.118*** -0.126 0.027
(-0.014) (-2.721) (-1.539) (0.411)
N 353 353 342 342
F 5.573 14.005 6.626 8.292
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.314 0.459 0.037 0.133
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.595 117.803 15.966 2.867
First-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.005 0.045 0.001 0.012
Second-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.569 0.604 0.417 0.530
a The dependent variable is the first difference of the deficit to GDP ratio of state i, the inde-
pendent variables of interest are the first difference of the weighted average of the other states’
deficit to GDP ratio and the first difference of the federal government’s deficit to GDP ratio.
b The instruments are: first difference of other states’ weighted average population growth, first
lag of other states’ weighted average population growth, first difference of lagged weighted
average of other states’ deficit to GDP ratio, second lag of other states’ weighted average deficit
to GDP ratio, first difference of federal election year dummy, first difference of federal ideology
dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i. e. AVG
refers to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where
fiscally similar states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where
fiscally dissimilar states receive a positive weight.
d Control variables whose results are omitted (full results can be found in table A.2 in the
appendix): Deficit to GDP ratiot−1, Debt to GDP ratio, Revenue to GDP ratio, Popula-
tion growth, Unemployment, Population share of young, Population share of old, Productiv-
ity growth, Votes in Bundesrat, Unification, Election year, SPD-Green-FDP dummy, SPD
dummy, SPD-PDS dummy, SPD-Green dummy, SPD-FDP dummy, CDU-SPD dummy, CDU-
FDP dummy, Interest rate, Federal debt, Trend. All control variables are included in first
differences.
e Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
f t-statistics in parentheses.
g t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
h State fixed effects and time trend included in all models.
i The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification.
Table 4: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German states,
1975-2005, Least squares dummy variable estimations, Robustness
checks for instrument validity
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Omitting other states’ population growth
Deficit of other states -0.744 -0.452 0.394 0.475
(-1.429) (-0.991) (0.860) (1.368)
Federal deficit 0.176 0.052 0.048 0.095
(1.115) (0.516) (0.384) (0.954)
Other states’ lagged deficit to GDP ratio in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states 3.235* 2.970*** 0.543* 0.439
(1.836) (2.918) (1.785) (1.131)
Federal deficit -0.393** -0.102 0.008 0.105
(-2.235) (-1.052) (0.070) (0.835)
Lag of other states’ deficit -0.903** -1.127*** -0.040 0.019
(-1.998) (-2.837) (-0.261) (0.153)
Federal election dummy in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states 0.032 0.296 0.464** 0.499*
(0.093) (0.858) (2.185) (1.766)
Federal deficit -0.134 -0.140* 0.047 0.100
(-1.439) (-1.849) (0.453) (1.010)
Federal election -0.101 -0.098 0.046 0.071
(-1.307) (-1.187) (0.801) (1.013)
Federal government’s ideology in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states -0.075 0.378 0.466** 0.505*
(-0.229) (1.108) (2.268) (1.780)
Federal deficit -0.278** -0.334*** 0.036 0.044
(-2.272) (-2.841) (0.174) (0.370)
Ideology federal government 0.495** 0.501*** 0.012 0.130
(2.550) (2.722) (0.031) (0.537)
Note: This table presents LSDV estimation results for models where (i) other states’ weighted average population growth is
dropped from the instrument set, (ii) other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio is included in the second
stage regression, (iii) the federal election dummy is included in the second stage regression, and (iv) the dummy indicating the
ideology of the federal government is included in the second stage regression. For further notes, see table 2.
Table 5: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German states,
1975-2005, Anderson-Hsiao estimations, Robustness checks for instru-
ment validity
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Omitting other states’ population growth
Deficit of other states 0.454 0.423** 0.210 0.557*
(1.556) (2.068) (1.521) (1.783)
Federal deficit 0.026 -0.120*** -0.096 -0.065
(0.351) (-2.774) (-0.917) (-0.592)
Other states’ lagged deficit to GDP ratio in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states 1.060 0.492 1.232* 0.094
(1.395) (0.875) (1.755) (0.340)
Federal deficit -0.097 -0.064 -0.259* 0.060
(-0.678) (-0.508) (-1.852) (0.820)
Lagged first difference of other states’ deficit 0.403 -0.201 0.582** 0.091
(1.350) (-0.497) (2.446) (1.142)
Second lag of other states’ deficit 0.550 -0.258 0.500 -0.029
(0.917) (-0.991) (1.439) (-0.388)
Federal election dummy in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states 0.357* 0.375** 0.271 0.333
(1.712) (2.154) (1.575) (1.491)
Federal deficit -0.013 -0.133*** -0.175 0.055
(-0.230) (-2.617) (-1.588) (0.642)
Federal election -0.026 -0.080 -0.064 0.041
(-0.479) (-1.314) (-0.915) (0.798)
Federal government’s ideology in second stage regressions
Deficit of other states 0.368 0.357** 0.239 0.240
(1.615) (2.113) (1.521) (0.958)
Federal deficit -0.008 -0.118*** -0.134* 0.021
(-0.125) (-2.762) (-1.705) (0.344)
Ideology federal government 0.094 0.125 0.159 0.098
(0.529) (0.794) (1.027) (0.642)
Note: This table presents Anderson-Hsiao estimation results for models where (i) other states’ weighted average population
growth is dropped from the instrument set, (ii) other states’ lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio is included in the
second stage regression (both the lagged first difference and the second lag of the level), (iii) the federal election dummy is
included in the second stage regression, and (iv) the dummy indicating the ideology of the federal government is included in
the second stage regression. For further notes, see table 3.
Table 6: Soft budget constraints vs. yardstick competition
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Election yes Deficit of other states -0.403 -0.075 0.341* 0.336
(-0.907) (-0.181) (1.734) (1.164)
no Deficit of other states 0.130 0.499 0.538** 0.460*
(0.369) (1.219) (2.215) (1.749)
t-test (p-value) 0.141 0.193 0.286 0.611
Conservative yes Deficit of other states 0.194 0.364 0.413* 0.427
(0.434) (0.741) (1.676) (1.481)
no Deficit of other states -0.058 0.245 0.427 0.380
(-0.163) (0.643) (1.493) (1.229)
t-test (p-value) 0.551 0.822 0.966 0.881
Notes: See table 2.
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Table A.1: Horizontal and vertical interactions in subnational borrowing,
German states, 1975-2005, Least squares dummy variable estima-
tions
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deficit to GDP ratio of other states -0.034 0.286 0.467** 0.483*
(-0.096) (0.827) (2.185) (1.734)
Federal deficit to GDP ratio -0.108 -0.128* 0.041 0.095
(-1.102) (-1.685) (0.387) (0.971)
Deficit to GDP ratiot−1 0.403*** 0.392*** 0.308*** 0.325***
(8.223) (8.681) (4.868) (6.124)
Debt to GDP ratio -6.504** -5.681** -1.744 -1.328
(-2.196) (-1.994) (-0.648) (-0.587)
Revenue to GDP ratio -13.017* -12.218 -27.200*** -25.616***
(-1.729) (-1.523) (-3.337) (-3.432)
Population growth -0.195* -0.124 0.005 0.007
(-1.840) (-1.078) (0.040) (0.047)
Unemployment 0.176** 0.140** 0.003 -0.006
(2.293) (2.146) (0.063) (-0.114)
Population share of young 33.796*** 30.680*** 13.473* 11.304
(3.997) (3.437) (1.912) (1.625)
Population share of old -12.599* -15.400** -25.030*** -21.720**
(-1.890) (-2.105) (-2.648) (-2.566)
Productivity growth 0.004 0.028 -0.080** -0.096***
(0.127) (0.890) (-2.484) (-2.609)
Votes in Bundesrat -0.079 -0.033 0.318 0.091
(-0.423) (-0.195) (1.389) (0.488)
Unification -0.926* -1.227*** -1.231*** -1.151***
(-1.758) (-2.731) (-3.584) (-3.090)
Election year 0.112 0.131 0.051 0.053
(0.782) (0.984) (0.546) (0.530)
SPD-Green-FDP 0.499 0.443 -0.506 -0.624*
(0.627) (0.525) (-1.379) (-1.823)
SPD 0.324* 0.340** 0.083 0.110
(1.917) (2.055) (0.434) (0.544)
SPD-PDS 0.885 0.878 0.060 0.025
(1.108) (1.129) (0.074) (0.028)
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SPD-Green 0.574*** 0.579*** 0.359* 0.393**
(3.173) (3.248) (1.925) (2.034)
SPD-FDP 0.358 0.398** 0.389* 0.343
(1.634) (2.063) (1.772) (1.541)
CDU-SPD -0.202 -0.179 -0.187 -0.074
(-1.062) (-0.935) (-0.943) (-0.318)
CDU-FDP 0.141 0.152 -0.030 0.039
(0.938) (1.032) (-0.295) (0.307)
Interest rate 0.210*** 0.164** 0.021 -0.013
(3.481) (2.021) (0.343) (-0.168)
Federal debt -19.787*** -15.997*** -5.551 -4.943
(-2.872) (-3.037) (-1.228) (-1.263)
Trend 0.286*** 0.258*** 0.095** 0.078*
(4.648) (4.822) (1.975) (1.831)
N 369 369 345 345
F 110.230 110.399 57.059 54.050
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.019 0.010 0.511 0.526
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.923 26.294 20.668 27.468
Autocorr.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.112 0.087
a The dependent variable is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i; the independent variables of interest
are the weighted average of the other states’ deficit to GDP ratio and the federal government’s deficit
to GDP ratio; the various combinations of the party dummy variables (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green,
PDS) indicate the ruling coalition in state i.
b The instruments are: other states’ weighted average population growth, lagged weighted average of
other states’ deficit to GDP ratio, federal election year dummy, federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i. e. AVG refers
to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where fiscally similar
states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where fiscally dissimilar states
receive a positive weight.
d Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
e t-statistics in parentheses.
f t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
g State fixed effects and time trend included in all models.
h The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification.
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Table A.2: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German
states, 1975-2005, Anderson-Hsiao estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deficit to GDP ratio of other states 0.393* 0.379** 0.256* 0.295
(1.843) (2.283) (1.708) (1.322)
Federal deficit to GDP ratio -0.001 -0.118*** -0.126 0.027
(-0.014) (-2.721) (-1.539) (0.411)
Deficit to GDP ratiot−1 -0.059 -0.112** -0.112** -0.070
(-0.970) (-2.065) (-2.035) (-1.392)
Debt to GDP ratio -35.151*** -34.370*** -31.113*** -34.597***
(-5.634) (-3.933) (-3.914) (-3.544)
Revenue to GDP ratio -21.936** -22.964** -32.733*** -31.768***
(-2.119) (-2.082) (-3.260) (-2.968)
Population growth 0.044 0.081 -0.013 0.049
(0.412) (0.657) (-0.121) (0.393)
Unemployment 0.104 0.060 0.166** 0.149**
(1.288) (0.657) (2.480) (2.335)
Population share of young -30.054* -21.633 -13.510 -24.401
(-1.949) (-1.152) (-0.844) (-1.502)
Population share of old 15.930 8.336 -2.529 8.067
(0.868) (0.565) (-0.162) (0.544)
Productivity growth 0.049 0.034 0.004 0.020
(1.438) (1.143) (0.131) (0.510)
Votes in Bundesrat 0.072 0.134 0.013 0.006
(0.251) (0.534) (0.048) (0.020)
Unification -0.127 -0.106 -0.141 -0.076
(-0.455) (-0.475) (-0.574) (-0.328)
Election 0.099 0.088 0.091 0.085
(1.392) (1.177) (1.278) (1.204)
SPD-Green-FDP 0.697 0.620 1.151 1.656*
(0.980) (1.004) (1.505) (1.670)
SPD 0.339 0.255 0.382 0.374
(1.229) (0.978) (1.315) (1.577)
SPD-PDS 1.160 1.378 1.123 0.974
(0.800) (1.083) (0.958) (0.920)
SPD-Green 0.202 0.235 0.181 0.142
(0.777) (1.071) (0.853) (0.616)
SPD-FDP 0.563 0.484 0.704** 0.744**
(1.564) (1.564) (2.228) (2.361)
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CDU-SPD -0.417 -0.298 -0.358 -0.553*
(-0.948) (-0.818) (-0.991) (-1.878)
CDU-FDP -0.009 -0.054 0.054 0.159
(-0.043) (-0.265) (0.269) (0.735)
Interest rate -0.014 -0.005 0.029 -0.039
(-0.196) (-0.063) (0.405) (-0.533)
Federal debt 2.726 -15.706** -11.797 0.932
(0.335) (-2.569) (-1.601) (0.143)
Trend -0.036 -0.300 0.114 -0.030
(-0.319) (-1.440) (1.163) (-0.400)
N 353 353 342 342
F 5.573 14.005 6.626 8.292
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.314 0.459 0.037 0.133
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.595 117.803 15.966 2.867
First-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.005 0.045 0.001 0.012
Second-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.569 0.604 0.417 0.530
a The dependent variable is the first difference of the deficit to GDP ratio of state i, the independent
variables of interest are the first difference of the weighted average of the other states’ deficit to
GDP ratio and the first difference of the federal government’s deficit to GDP ratio; the various
combinations of the party dummy variables (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green, PDS) indicate the ruling
coalition in state i.
b The instruments are: first difference of other states’ weighted average population growth, first lag
of other states’ weighted average population growth, first difference of lagged weighted average of
other states’ deficit to GDP ratio, second lag of other states’ weighted average deficit to GDP ratio,
first difference of federal election year dummy, first difference of federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i. e. AVG refers
to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where fiscally similar
states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where fiscally dissimilar states
receive a positive weight.
d Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
e t-statistics in parentheses.
f t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
g State fixed effects and time trend included in all models.
h The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Variance Mean SD Min Max Obs.
Deficit of other
states
overall 1.63 1.71 -3.48 10.97 369
between 1.21 0.42 4.53 16
within 1.37 -4.09 9.51 23.06
Federal deficit overall 1.96 1.58 -0.83 7.79 369
between 0.03 1.93 2.05 16
within 1.58 -0.92 7.81 23.06
Debt overall 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.69 369
between 0.08 0.10 0.38 16
within 0.06 0.02 0.56 23.06
Revenues overall 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.32 369
between 0.05 0.14 0.27 16
within 0.02 0.13 0.24 23.06
Population growth overall 0.08 0.68 -2.23 2.09 369
between 0.47 -0.96 0.56 16
within 0.54 -2.47 2.06 23.06
Unemployment overall 10.83 4.91 2.10 22.10 369
between 5.09 5.49 20.28 16
within 2.30 2.98 16.38 23.06
Population share of
young
overall 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.23 369
between 0.01 0.14 0.18 16
within 0.02 0.12 0.22 23.06
Population share of
old
overall 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.22 369
between 0.01 0.15 0.19 16
within 0.01 0.13 0.21 23.06
Productivity
growth
overall 1.64 2.41 -3.14 16.17 369
between 1.39 0.53 4.12 16
within 2.14 -2.95 13.68 23.06
Votes in Bundesrat overall 4.23 1.02 3.00 6.00 369
between 0.93 3.00 5.52 16
within 0.31 3.72 4.89 23.06
Unification overall 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.24 0.52 1.00 16
within 0.44 0.10 1.10 23.06
Election year overall 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.03 0.21 0.31 16
within 0.43 -0.07 1.03 23.06
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SPD-Green-FDP overall 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.04 0.00 0.15 16
within 0.11 -0.14 0.91 23.06
SPD overall 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.23 0.00 0.59 16
within 0.37 -0.34 1.15 23.06
SPD-PDS overall 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.15 0.00 0.54 16
within 0.13 -0.51 0.74 23.06
SPD-Green overall 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.13 0.00 0.31 16
within 0.27 -0.21 0.97 23.06
SPD-FDP overall 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.14 0.00 0.52 16
within 0.22 -0.44 0.97 23.06
CDU-SPD overall 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.22 0.00 0.71 16
within 0.26 -0.60 1.08 23.06
CDU-FDP overall 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.15 0.00 0.46 16
within 0.32 -0.32 1.10 23.06
Interest rate overall 6.29 1.67 3.35 10.24 369
between 0.68 5.19 6.58 16
within 1.57 3.06 9.95 23.06
Federal debt overall 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.39 369
between 0.04 0.26 0.35 16
within 0.08 0.13 0.41 23.06
a) Summary statistics are based on the observations used in the regressions
b) The deficit of other states and federal deficit variables are percentage points (percentages multiplied by 100),
the other fiscal ratios (debt, revenues, federal debt) are percentages.
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